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Abstract:  
 
Structural transformation requires raising productivity and achieving competitiveness 
in increasingly higher-valued activities. This process can be constrained by different 
types of knowledge gaps. The importance of codified knowledge and practical know-
how or skills are well recognized. But another type of knowledge critically affects the 
value of both. A society must have firms with the organizational capabilities to 
organize production competitively so that educated and skilled people can be employed 
profitably. This is a specific type of collective knowledge distinct from the codified 
knowledge and know-how embodied in individuals. Without appropriate organizational 
capabilities, investments in other types of knowledge can fail to achieve adequate 
returns. The required organizational capabilities can range from basic, intermediate to 
dynamic, depending on whether firms in the sector are catching up or innovating. 
Effective learning strategies have to identify and target interdependent knowledge gaps 
and to do this effectively, they also have to recognize distinct institutional and political 
economy problems of implementation. The general points are illustrated with reference 
to the emergence of the garments industry in Bangladesh and the challenges facing its 
upgrading.  
 
Highlights: 
 
Interdependence between codified knowledge, skills and organizational capabilities  
 
Distinction between basic, intermediate and dynamic organizational capabilities  
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Recognizing interdependencies of knowledge gaps and political contexts is important 
for effective policy  
 
Case of Bangladesh garments industry  
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1. Introduction  
Sustainable structural transformation requires raising productivity across different 
sectors and achieving competitiveness in progressively higher value-adding sectors. 
The absence of appropriate levels of knowledge, skills and capabilities can slow down 
these processes. Most studies of knowledge gaps ignore the interdependencies between 
different types of knowledge. The economic effects of investments in knowledge have 
usually been studied by looking at investments in formal education, or years of 
schooling, as the measure of levels and increases in knowledge (Romer 1986; Lucas 
1990). The implicit assumption is that investments in formal education correlate well 
with the development of all types of knowledge, an assumption that I will argue is very 
misleading. This assumption is shared in many empirical estimates of knowledge gaps 
which focus on formal education. For instance, one study estimates that by 2020 the 
growth of higher-technology sectors is likely to be constrained by a global shortfall of 
40 million college-educated workers (13 percent of demand) and the growth of labour-
intensive sectors by a shortfall of 45 million workers with secondary education (15 
percent of demand). At the same time, there is likely to be an excess supply of 90-95 
million unskilled workers (10 percent of this category) (Dobbs, et al. 2012).  
 
I will argue that the problem is much more serious. It is not just a question of churning 
out workers with secondary or higher levels of education in the right numbers to meet 
projected demands. These workers also need to have appropriate know-how to be able 
to operate existing and emerging technologies competitively. Most importantly, well-
organized firms have to emerge to employ these persons at high enough levels of 
productivity to achieve competitiveness. Organizational efficiency is also based on 
knowledge, but it is knowledge of a different type. It is not knowledge that an individual 
has, but the knowledge that a large number of individuals have about how to effectively 
cooperate and coordinate with each other within an organization. Without the latter, 
investments in codified knowledge and skills may achieve low returns. The absence of 
any one element can wipe out potential returns to investments in other types of 
knowledge. In particular, in the absence of capable firms that can employ workers 
productively, investments in education and skills may only result in the emergence of 
large numbers of unemployed people with education and skills.  
 
A better understanding of the differences in types of learning and the processes through 
which they are acquired is therefore essential for the design of effective knowledge 
policies for supporting structural transformation. First, the pedagogic processes of 
knowledge acquisition are different for different types of knowledge. As a result the 
policy challenges can be very different depending on initial conditions and the choice 
of sectors, which determine the mix of knowledge that has to be acquired. Secondly, 
the implementation of different learning strategies is likely to require the allocation of 
policy resources to meet relevant knowledge gaps. If these policy resources are not to 
be wasted, those receiving support for different types of learning have to achieve 
desired standards, otherwise support has to be withdrawn or withheld. The feasibility 
of particular strategies can therefore depend on the configuration of organizational 
power in that society, its ‘political settlement’, which can determine how particular 
policies are likely to be implemented or distorted by powerful interests who are being 
assisted to support learning (Khan 2013c, 2017). If resources are provided to 
individuals or organizations who cannot be disciplined despite failing to meet minimum 
standards, the strategy is likely to fail. An effective learning strategy therefore has to 
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identify both the relevant knowledge gaps, and the policies that can be effectively 
implemented to address these gaps given the political settlement in that country.  
 
2. Types of knowledge  
Codified knowledge is knowledge that can be communicated in words or symbols in 
traditional classroom teaching, textbooks, or visual media. Formal educational 
establishments are the usual delivery mechanism for codified knowledge. However, 
many types of knowledge are not codifiable or are only partially codifiable. Typically, 
uncodifiable knowledge is of the ‘knowing-how-to’ variety, embedded in unconscious 
and often complex routines that are understood and internalized through learning by 
doing and practice. These types of knowledge are often equivalently described as skills, 
know-how or tacit knowledge. The transmission of tacit knowledge requires learning-
by-doing rather than, or in addition to, traditional teaching. The distinction between 
codified and tacit knowledge also involves important pedagogic differences in the 
processes through which the knowledge is acquired (Polanyi 1967). Finally, 
organizational capabilities require knowledge of how to effectively organize collective 
activities in particular technologies and social and political contexts in ways that 
achieve competitiveness. Codified knowledge and skills are types of knowledge that 
are embodied in individuals. In contrast, organizational capability describes knowledge 
held by a collective, embedded in interactive routines and practices that are specific to 
an organization. This knowledge can be very specific to organizations and may not be 
exactly the same across similar organizations producing similar products or services.  
 
Pedagogically, codified knowledge can be transmitted through formal teaching 
methods. But generally skills cannot be learnt in this way. Learning how to drive, for 
example, is almost impossible by attending lectures, reading training manuals or even 
watching videos. These can help to improve the skills of drivers by providing the 
background codified knowledge for informed responses in different situations, or to 
learn traffic rules. But the only effective way of learning to drive is to be in a car with 
an instructor and learn by doing. Provided the instructor is skilled and the learner puts 
in appropriate learning effort in responding to mistakes and feedbacks, a series of 
complex responses and corrective steps gradually become habits and routines. At some 
point sufficient tacit knowledge will have been mastered to make driving both effective 
and relatively effortless. Learning carpentry, bricklaying or stitching garments is 
similar to learning driving. The learning in all these cases is largely about practising the 
use of techniques to develop routines and habits supporting rapid corrective steps, 
informed responses to new situations, and so on. The know-how type of knowledge 
therefore has to be acquired through practical demonstration and participation in 
activity in apprenticeships, technical and vocational training programmes or on-the-job 
training. However, some codified knowledge can be a precondition for acquiring some 
skills and can also accelerate the learning process. Skills are also usually very specific 
to particular jobs and technologies, and the tacit and context-specific nature of the 
learning means that it can only be acquired through learning-by-doing in very specific 
settings (Lall 1992, 2000a, 2000b, 2003). 
 
The third type of knowledge is often ignored in discussions of the knowledge required 
for achieving productivity growth and competitiveness. The productivity of individuals 
in a firm depends not only on the codified knowledge and skills of the individuals within 
the firm but also on how efficiently collective activities are organized within the firm. 
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In addition to individual codified knowledge and skills, individuals in an efficient firm 
have to know how to respond effectively to others in that firm to maximize the quality 
and quantity of the overall goods and services provided. This requires an organization 
that can efficiently coordinate activities and incentivize some actions and penalize 
others to optimize the collective outputs of the organization. I use the term 
organizational capability as a measure of the effectiveness of an organization in 
coordinating and optimizing these collective activities. Unlike most skills that are based 
on the tacit knowledge of individuals, the knowledge that achieves a high level of 
organizational capability of an organization is the collective knowledge within the 
organization to implement interactive procedures required for the efficient operation of 
the team. This knowledge is not about how to operate particular machines or equipment 
but knowledge of how to interact within the organization given its technologies of 
production, organizational structure and the characteristics of other individuals in the 
organization. This knowledge is partly tacit and partly codified, but it is distinct in being 
collectively-held knowledge. Everyone in an effective organization does not have to 
have the same organizational knowledge, but all members of an organization need to 
know their part of the organizational routines to enable the organization to operate 
optimally (Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi 1988; Perez and Soete 1988).  
 
The pedagogic processes required to acquire organizational capabilities are different, 
more complex, and vary by context and type of organization. The enhancement of 
organizational capabilities may require the acquisition of both codified and tacit 
knowledge, but it is misleading to reduce this to the other two types of knowledge. The 
primary difference between learning that is individual and learning that is collective is 
that in the latter, the individuals have to learn interactive routines collectively. The 
problem is much simpler if a well-working organization already exists, because here an 
individual joining the organization simply has to learn how to adapt their responses to 
the well-working organization. This requires individual learning-by-doing. However, 
when the organization as a whole has something missing, the collective effort of 
learning is much more complex and requires collective learning-by-doing, 
experimentation with routines and adaptation till levels of competitiveness comparable 
to competitors is achieved. This learning process involves a much higher level of effort 
and the challenges of organizing it can be significant. The difference between an 
individual learning individual routines in an already efficient organization and the 
organization collectively becoming efficient by adopting appropriate routines can be 
seen most powerfully when an individual from a firm in a developing country with low 
organizational capabilities migrates to an advanced country and joins a firm with high 
organizational capabilities. In a very short time, the migrating individual significantly 
increases their individual productivity by adapting to the routines of the firm with high 
organizational capabilities. Improving the organizational capability of the developing 
country firm as a collective is a much more complex collective action process.   
 
A supply of entrepreneurs, managers and supervisors with high levels of codified 
knowledge and individual know-how is by no means sufficient for the emergence of a 
competitive firm. If organizational capabilities are absent, their acquisition requires a 
complex process of collective learning-by-doing. Achieving this usually involves a 
two-stage learning process. First, managers and supervisors have to acquire an 
understanding of the internal organization of competitive firms in that sector and this 
can involve acquiring both the relevant codified knowledge and know-how. Secondly, 
they have to successfully adapt these routines and systems to local conditions in a 
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broader collective learning process till the team as a whole understands and can perform 
effectively within that organizational structure. A team that is able to implement an 
efficient organizational structure that is potentially competitive by adopting and 
adapting routines appropriate to that context will have achieved competitive levels of 
organizational capability.  
 
Organizational capabilities are always relative. If an organization with similar human 
and physical capital as another improves its productivity by organizing its production 
more efficiently, it achieves a higher organizational capability. We will see later that 
very significant differences in productivity can exist across firms using similar 
technologies and with similar human capital as a result of differences in their 
organizational capabilities. While many developing country firms can acquire 
machinery for many basic production activities, and they often have supplies of 
educated and skilled workers, they lack the capability to bring all this together to 
produce competitive goods and services. An important factor complicating the 
acquisition of organizational capabilities is that the most effective organizational design 
for a firm and its internal operating procedures can be very different across countries, 
even for the same type of product and across sectors within a country (Whitley 1992). 
This is not only because technologies differ, but also because social hierarchies, norms 
of collective work, external governance structures, and so on vary greatly. All of this 
can affect optimal organizational design and the routines that can be effectively 
implemented in that context. As a result the simple imitation of formal organizational 
structures from another context will not necessarily work and collective learning-by-
doing is necessary to adapt the functions of particular routines to suit local contexts. 
This learning process becomes more complex with higher-value products because more 
complicated technical, quality control and organizational processes are likely to be 
involved to achieve efficient outcomes. This implies correspondingly more challenging 
collective organizational learning.  
 
An efficient organizational structure does of course have a formal or codified structure 
describing its organizational map. This is a formal description of the functions of 
responsible agents, their sources of information, their lines of management, their 
incentives and penalties, and their decision-making and authoritative powers. However, 
knowing a codified organizational map is not sufficient to achieve competitiveness 
because the real operational efficiency of an organization depends on the actual 
behaviour of its managers and workers. When sufficiently high levels of organizational 
capabilities have been acquired, most individuals within the organization will be acting 
automatically in collectively efficient ways most of the time. But administrative staff 
will also be effectively implementing organizational rules for incentives and penalties 
to manage occasional free riding, internal conflicts or coordination failures. This 
optimized collective outcome is therefore based on a mix of codified and tacit 
knowledge spread across all members of the organization who are behaving according 
to various routines and interactive processes that they have internalized, together with 
their knowledge to operate physical systems of coordination, reporting, information 
collection, incentives and so on that can be embedded in physical infrastructure like 
software, reporting and monitoring systems. All of this knowledge has to be acquired 
to raise the organizational capability of a firm to a competitive level and is likely to be 
a combination of codified and tacit knowledge of intra-organizational interactions that 
are collectively required to achieve competitiveness (Dosi, et al. 2000). 
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Source: Author 
Figure 1 Types of knowledge relevant for competitiveness 
 
The interdependence of our three types of knowledge is summarized in Figure 1. Some 
types of codified knowledge can assist or may be essential for the acquisition of some 
skills, and also for enhancing organizational capabilities. Similarly, skills like the 
knowledge of how to operate particular software programmes or operate mechanical, 
chemical or electronic processes may be a prerequisite for acquiring further codified 
knowledge and some skills may be a prerequisite for engaging in collective learning to 
enhance organizational capabilities. Finally, the knowledge of how to operate in 
organizations with high levels of organizational capability can be a prerequisite for 
realizing the potential of many types of formal education and to realize the full potential 
of skills like the know-how of operating particular types of machinery. Developments 
in one type of knowledge can also spur developments in other types in a dynamic way. 
For instance, the application of know-how in the workplace to engage in process 
innovations can identify knowledge constraints that drive research that generates 
codified knowledge that in turn helps to overcome these constraints. 
 
3. Competitiveness and types of organizational capabilities  
The insight that entrepreneurs and firms play a critical role in creating competitive 
advantage has its roots in several important strands of economic theory. However, much 
of this theory emerged to address advanced country questions about the capabilities 
required to enhance competitiveness in innovative ways. This understanding is very 
important, but needs to be substantially modified to incorporate the typical developing 
country problem of acquiring competitiveness in known and quite basic technologies. 
In Schumpeter’s (1934) theory of creative destruction, entrepreneurs drive innovation 
by looking for ‘new combinations’, creating new products that allow them to earn 
temporary monopoly profits. While Schumpeter focused on the role of entrepreneurs, 
the internal organizational capability of firms to drive growth was the subject of Edith 
Penrose’s 1959 book on the theory of growth of the firm (Penrose 2009). In this seminal 
work, Penrose argued that the growth of firms was driven by ‘managerial resources’. 
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Firms grow when they have unused managerial resources with the knowledge and 
capacity to organize new projects. This enables the firm to drive growth by drawing on 
and extending their knowledge of processes. The Penrosian analysis highlights the 
specificity of these capabilities. The knowledge of managers based on their experiences 
is hard to transmit and cannot be bought unless managers themselves move. In other 
words, organizational knowledge, in this case focusing on the knowledge of 
management, is tacit and specific to the firm. Both Schumpeter and Penrose in different 
ways overturned the standard economics treatment of the firm as a black box that 
responds to market signals. Instead they shifted the analytical focus to internal 
entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities as drivers of organizational evolution and 
product innovation. For both, growth and innovation were driven by entrepreneurs 
seeking to enhance their competitiveness by differentiating their products and services 
from others, thereby earning above-normal profits. 
 
Drawing on the work of Schumpeter and Penrose, a literature on the dynamic 
capabilities of firms developed to analyse the organizational capabilities required by 
firms to maintain and extend their competitive advantage. These dynamic capabilities 
are required to be able to respond to market, technological and environmental changes 
and opportunities and to meet customer requirements in new ways, allowing these firms 
to earn rents (Teece and Pisano 1994; Teece, et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; 
Zollo and Winter 2002; Cordes-Berszinn 2013). Research on dynamic capabilities has 
tried to identify patterns in the organizational practices of successful firms that allow 
them to experiment, adapt and learn from their experiences, as this is essential to drive 
organizational and technical innovations to maintain or extend competitive advantage. 
A limitation of these approaches from our perspective is that their subjects are the most 
dynamic firms in advanced countries. As a result the use of the term organizational 
capabilities in this literature seems to suggest that it is the capability to organize 
technical and organizational change. This can be confusing but the confusion is easy to 
address. Organizing production competitively with given technology is clearly an 
organizational capability that is critically important and missing in many sectors in 
many developing countries. Equally the routines and capabilities that can further 
modify these organizational and productive structures to achieve further improvements 
in competitiveness are second-order organizational capabilities, of great significance in 
advanced countries. For a more general understanding of organizational capabilities we 
need to incorporate these differences and extend these insights in a number of ways.  
 
First, we need to recognize that the dynamic capabilities required for innovation are 
quite different from the ‘basic’ organizational capabilities necessary for operating firms 
in competitive markets with known technologies. For firms to develop dynamic 
capabilities that allow them to drive Schumpeterian or Penrosian growth and earn 
above-normal profits, they must already have high levels of basic organizational 
capabilities so that the basic tasks of effectively organizing teamwork already exist. For 
much of the world (including parts of advanced countries that have deindustrialized) 
the more relevant organizational challenge is to create firms with basic organizational 
capabilities, which can operate in competitive markets and make normal profits using 
known technologies. This is mainly about absorbing known organizational routines 
from competitive firms elsewhere and adapting them to local conditions, hierarchies, 
and governance conditions. It turns out that this is much more difficult than is often 
assumed. Innovating firms earning Schumpeterian rents are unlikely to spontaneously 
emerge in a context where normal-profit firms do not exist. They are more likely to 
9 
 
evolve from or be spun out of, or be created by entrepreneurs and managers who can 
draw on teams with the experience of working in competitive organizations operating 
in less innovative segments of the market. The challenge of creating firms with basic 
organizational capabilities is therefore different from that of developing dynamic 
capabilities but may be no less difficult. This challenge has been the subject of the 
developmental state literature on learning and catching up (Amsden 1989). But even in 
this literature the complexities of acquiring basic organizational capabilities have not 
been adequately discussed. In contrast, the Schumpeterian and dynamic capabilities 
literature focuses on advanced countries where the primary challenge is to drive 
innovation. The two strands of literature are related, and can benefit greatly from cross-
fertilization.  
 
A second feature of the advanced country literature on organizational capabilities is that 
it has generally given inadequate attention to the problem of conflicts and free-riding 
within the firm. These have, of course, been the subject of an extensive institutional 
economics literature (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1988; Hart and Moore 1990). The problem of 
responding to free-riding and rule violations within firms is a necessary condition of 
enhancing organizational capabilities such that a higher joint output can be achieved. 
Efficient routines for enhancing the coordination and efficiency of collective work may 
not work unless we also look at possible incentives for internal rule violations and free-
riding behaviour and how these can be organizationally countered in specific contexts. 
In advanced countries basic organizational capabilities are widely available, and many 
firms already exist which have successfully solved these problems. The dynamic 
capabilities literature therefore does not give much attention to the problem of enforcing 
the adherence to internal routines. It is more concerned with the identification of more 
effective routines assuming they will be enforceable.  
 
However, when countries are trying to develop basic organizational capabilities, the 
internal adherence to formal organizational structures is weak and has to be directly 
addressed in the organizational design of firms. It turns out that differences in social 
and political conditions can have a significant effect on the types of organizations that 
appear to be effective in achieving internal control and efficiency (Whitley 1992). For 
instance, in some countries small family firms dominate at early stages of development 
because larger firms are unable to deal with free-riding and conflicts using formal 
organizational structures. Other countries can make the transition to larger formal firms 
at an earlier stage. The critical questions of controlling free riding and conflicts are 
particularly important if public policy is being used to assist the development of 
organizational capabilities of any sort, because free-riding can also lead to low levels 
of learning effort that can easily derail policy and result in wasted resources. I will draw 
on these different insights to develop a more general analysis of organizational 
capabilities and policy challenges, with a particular focus on developing countries 
attempting to achieve structural transformation.  
 
A general analysis of organizational capabilities therefore has to distinguish between 
different types of organizations and the capabilities they have to acquire to become 
competitive. The production of even the simplest products in firms exposed to 
international competition can require fairly complex organizational capabilities that I 
will describe as basic. These firms have to achieve these capabilities just to generate 
‘normal’ profits with known technologies in competitive markets. Firms engaged in 
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garments, textiles, footwear and other types of normal-profit productive activities are 
in this category. Remarkably, for most of the world, there are an inadequate number of 
firms with these basic organizational capabilities, so the discussion of any more 
sophisticated capabilities is premature in most cases.  
 
At the other end of the scale, we have organizations that can engage in innovative 
activities to continuously upgrade their existing technical and organizational 
capabilities. In other words, they have the capabilities to change their capabilities. This 
allows them to provide a stream of new products and services to earn above-normal 
profits by continuously differentiating their products from others and creating 
oligopolistic markets for themselves. As the Schumpeterian or Penrosian analysis 
shows, this requires organizational capabilities which can be described as dynamic. 
These involve organizational structures and processes, with associated routines, that 
allow the firm to innovate new products and processes and drive internal organizational 
changes to deliver innovative products. Firms innovating new types of electric cars, 
semiconductors or batteries would be examples of contemporary firms in this segment.  
 
Finally, it is useful to distinguish an intermediate type of firm that is not necessarily 
engaging in significant product innovation but is operating in sectors where ongoing 
technical change is happening in lead countries and these firms therefore have to 
continuously imitate and adapt to maintain their competitiveness. They are usually 
suppliers or assemblers in developing countries for lead companies that have dynamic 
capabilities, usually located in advanced countries. Some of these intermediate 
capability companies may also be engaged in process innovations of their own. These 
firms require intermediate levels of organizational capabilities, somewhere in between 
basic and dynamic. They operate in sectors like automobile or electronics components 
and assembly in developing countries where entirely new products are not being 
innovated by these firms, but to remain as suppliers to or assemblers for dynamic lead 
companies that are innovating, they have to continuously upgrade their own 
manufacturing processes. These firms therefore have to keep abreast of technical and 
organizational changes happening elsewhere to maintain their competitiveness in 
supplying or assembling increasingly sophisticated or higher quality products. These 
firms are primarily imitating and catching up with organizational and technical 
capabilities elsewhere, as basic firms are, but here the imitation is of a moving target, 
or at least, a target that is moving much faster than say in garments or footwear. They 
may sometimes be making higher than normal profits but they face intense competition 
and may often be only earning normal profits.  
 
Basic, intermediate and dynamic organizational capabilities are therefore segments 
along a continuum, but the distinctions between them are important for policy. First, 
the feasibility of a capability development strategy depends on initial conditions. A 
strategy can fail if it tries to develop organizations requiring dynamic or intermediate 
capabilities in contexts where basic capabilities are missing. Failure can include cases 
of ‘success’ where a small island of firms are created with high organizational 
capabilities but which do not result in imitation or clustering because the average 
organizational capability of the society is too far removed. This does not mean that the 
way to develop an automobile industry is to first develop a garments industry. Firms 
making garments do not necessarily evolve into making automobiles. But it does mean 
that if a region does not yet have the organizational capabilities to develop a garments 
industry, attempting to develop clusters of automobile components producers is likely 
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to be very difficult on any scale. Secondly, the emergence of a large number of lower-
technology firms is a good way of ensuring that growth is inclusive and creates many 
jobs. These firms can be component suppliers who create jobs in developing countries 
even if the value added and profits are higher in the lead dynamic firms that are engaged 
in design and product development in advanced countries. If we see development as the 
organizational transformation of a society, the emergence of large numbers of basic and 
intermediate capability firms is the most effective way of moving large numbers of 
workers from agriculture and informal sectors into organized modern factory 
production. Finally, as societies develop more sophisticated intermediate-capability 
firms, conditions are created for the emergence of firms with dynamic capabilities. 
These firms can drive innovation, but their developmental effects are greatest if basic 
and intermediate-capability component suppliers and subcontractors exist to link with 
them in their value chains to create many more jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
This is the desirable path of industrialization, rather than one where a few high-
capability firms exist as islands with few employment spillovers.  
 
How important are organizational capabilities for productivity? It turns out that even 
basic organizational routines have an outsized impact on the productivity of a firm. For 
instance, if a machine breaks down and a solution is not rapidly found, this can have 
cascading effects throughout the production line. The rapid resolution of this problem 
requires an organizational response that is likely to involve others beyond the workers 
operating the machine. Effective routines and responses to different types of 
breakdowns can have a large impact on overall productivity. Similarly, without routines 
for maintaining quality control there may be high levels of output rejection that affect 
measures of aggregate productivity. Poor organization of inventories, poor coordination 
across production lines, the failure to identify and resolve bottlenecks, the failure to 
identify absentees or those off sick and to find immediate replacements, or poor order 
management are all examples of organizational failures that can each result in 
production slowdowns, work stoppages and low throughput rates. Organizations also 
need to find combinations of carrot and stick solutions to free riding behaviour and 
internal conflicts. This is essential not only to maintain collective output, but also to 
prevent low morale leading to more free riding. A firm that is poorly organized along 
any of these dimensions can register significantly lower productivity even with very 
simple technologies and it can fail to become competitive regardless of the skills and 
knowledge of individual workers.  
 
The staggering scale of productivity differences across firms producing the same 
products with the same machinery and comparable human capital can be seen in the 
example of the Indian textile industry in Clark and Wolcott  (2012). Huge productivity 
differentials between India and other countries meant India could not develop a cotton 
textile industry for a long time despite lower wages compared to competitors. However, 
Clark and Wolcott’s explanation of this productivity gap is not convincing. They argue 
that Indian cultural attitudes sustained poor organizational behaviour. A more plausible 
explanation is that India failed to develop organizational capabilities in textile firms 
for a long time. In the late nineteenth century British India had no public policies to 
support the acquisition of organizational capabilities. Despite using exactly the same 
machines as global textile leaders in England and elsewhere, and despite the sector 
requiring relatively low labour skills, Indian productivity was so low that lower Indian 
wages did not compensate and the sector remained uncompetitive. Profitability was 
very low and disappeared entirely when Japan entered the cotton textile market in 1924 
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(Clark and Wolcott 2012: Table 4). More than fifty years later, and despite significant 
post-colonial policies for supporting infant industries, the relative productivity problem 
had only marginally improved. Some Indian textile production became profitable, but 
in 1978 output per worker-hour in cotton spinning in the US was still 7.4 times higher 
than in India using the same machinery. What could possibly explain productivity 
differentials of this magnitude? Even if American workers had higher levels of formal 
education, this cannot plausibly explain why using the same relatively simple 
machinery that does not require high levels of codified knowledge or skills, they were 
still producing 640% more output every hour.  
 
Clark and Wolcott’s own explanation goes partly in the right direction but is ultimately 
not satisfactory. Their analysis, in the institutional economics tradition, argues that 
modern factory production creates a non-separable output that can result in free-riding 
behaviour (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Non-separability means that the contribution 
of an individual in an organization depends on what others are doing. The implication 
is that if an individual decides to free ride by working a little less it is not possible to 
detect this by looking at the output of the individual because the output is a joint 
product. For the output of the organization to remain high, the organization has to 
ensure that individuals do not free ride. This insight focuses our attention on the 
organizational design that can counter free-riding behaviour. Like Alchian and 
Demsetz, Clark and Wolcott argue that free riding and opportunistic behaviour are the 
major causes of organizational failure, resulting in high levels of shirking and a collapse 
of the collective output. In my view, poor organizational routines can result in low 
collective productivity for a number of other reasons, such as the failure to correct 
breakdowns rapidly or to maintain quality control, which are not necessarily connected 
to free-riding behaviour. But this is not my major criticism of Clark and Wolcott’s 
explanation of low productivity in the Indian textile industry. The real problem is that 
they attribute opportunistic behaviour within the firm (which is surely part of the 
problem of low organizational capability) to the absence of a ‘gift-giving culture’ in 
countries like India. They argue that cooperative productive behaviour is only 
sustainable in cultures where individuals are generous in giving without expecting. This 
enables employers and workers to trust each other and makes the monitoring of 
individuals in the organization cheaper and more effective. This explanation makes 
organizational capability entirely dependent on a culture of gift-giving which is not 
plausible. Organizational capabilities can be acquired, and indeed India managed to 
improve these capabilities to develop a competitive textile industry despite persistent 
productivity gaps with competitor countries.  
 
Clark and Wolcott do make it clear that this cultural problem is not in any way innate 
in genetics or deeply held group attitudes, but is rather a description of a behavioural 
equilibrium. When a critical minimum number of people in a society become generous, 
it can become rational for most individuals to become generous and vice versa. Indeed, 
they point out that when Indian workers migrate to the US their productivity 
immediately improves because they can work in firms with greater trust and their own 
behaviour changes. In fact, their major policy recommendation is to encourage 
migration within and between countries. Even if we accept for a moment that 
opportunism and free riding are the primary causes of organizational failure, and that 
there are different levels of trust in societies, Clark and Wolcott effectively rule out the 
possibility that organizational design and learning is one way in which cooperative 
behaviour can be inculcated within organizations and ultimately societies. In other 
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words, they ignore the possibility that designing organizations and improving their 
internal routines is a way of changing ‘culture’ within the organization, defined as a 
behavioural equilibrium. However, the evidence across countries shows that 
organizational capabilities can be acquired, that behaviour within organizations can 
change through the learning of new routines with appropriate carrots and sticks, and 
that this is a more effective solution to low productivity than migration. The dramatic 
take-off in the garments industry in Bangladesh in the late 1970s that we look at later 
was not preceded by any change in the national culture of trust, or even by any 
significant skills programmes for workers. It was entirely driven by the acquisition of 
critical organizational capabilities.  
 
4. Learning organizational capabilities  
The policy challenges of developing organizational capabilities in developing countries 
has been an important question in the developmental literature. In her seminal work, 
Alice Amsden (1989) questioned the adequacy of the Schumpeterian model of 
innovation for developing countries and argued that for them growth was based on 
‘learning’, the process through which follower countries adopt technical and 
organizational capabilities from more advanced ones. The important point that Amsden 
makes is that while there are significant differences in the technical and organizational 
requirements of different technologies, by and large, developing countries are learning 
to produce products that have already been produced somewhere else. Innovation only 
begins when firms have the organizational and technical capabilities to innovate 
entirely new products. Amsden was directing attention to what I have called basic and 
intermediate organizational capabilities, which are the critical organizational 
capabilities for developing countries.  
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Figure 2 Organizational Capabilities, Learning and Innovation 
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Figure 2 combines Amsden’s insights on learning and innovation with our earlier 
discussion. The challenge for developing countries is to move along the first row of 
Figure 2, from the creation of a broad base of competitive lower-technology firms to a 
growing number of intermediate higher-technology firms. For most developing 
countries, the creation of a broad base of firms with basic organizational capabilities is 
the most important challenge. A desirable trajectory of organizational capability 
development and industrial upgrading is shown by the grey arrow in Figure 2 with an 
integrated modern productive sector gradually deepening (Khan 2015). Truly 
innovating firms only emerge when some of the more advanced higher-technology 
firms achieve sufficient technical and dynamic organizational capabilities to drive their 
own innovation. 
 
The number of firms that can drive innovation in a country is likely to be low till the 
country as a whole has advanced to the point where the social infrastructure supports 
significant expenditures on formal education and on research. Innovation by dynamic 
firms can also help other types of firms by creating demand for new components 
produced by lower-technology intermediate and basic capability firms. Organizational 
learning, as shown in Figure 2 is therefore an ongoing process. The most appropriate 
capability-development strategy for a country will depend on its initial mix of 
capabilities, but in most developing countries support for the development of basic 
organizational capabilities is likely to be an important part of the mix. The less 
developed a country, the more important it is to raise the average level of social 
organization by supporting the development of a broad base of firms with basic, and 
eventually, intermediate organizational capabilities.  
 
Public support for capability development can be wasted if firms fail to achieve 
improvements in productivity. This is a variant of a free-riding problem where 
organizations receiving support to develop productivity waste it or divert it to other 
uses. The importance of disciplining is not disputed but what it means is often not clear. 
There are some broad answers in the development literature, but the problem is that the 
design of policy, and the governance of disciplining, depends on the problems that have 
to be addressed and the relative power of firms and government agencies that determine 
the feasibility of different strategies. States are not uniformly ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. 
Apparently weak states may be able to carry out some types of disciplining if policies 
are designed in ways that take the distribution of power into account. Amsden’s insight 
was to remind us that the market cannot discipline firms receiving subsidies (because 
firms receiving subsidies are by definition insulated from the market), so the state has 
to ensure that firms failing to raise their capabilities should at some point lose their 
subsidies (Amsden 1989: 3-20). South Korea and Taiwan in East Asia achieved success 
with their industrial policies because their states could provide ex ante support to firms 
with credible disciplining that resulted in a withdrawal of support if performance was 
poor (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Lall 1992, 2000b, 2003). Policy support came in a 
variety of forms including tariffs, export subsidies and low interest loans. Performance 
was observed ex post and compulsions for rapid learning of organizational and technical 
capabilities were created by signalling that support would be withdrawn from poorly 
performing firms or sectors.  
 
However, while this worked in East Asia, the developmental state literature did not 
provide a full explanation of why it worked and what the policy lessons are for countries 
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where the same policies worked less well. In Amsden’s analysis, productivity growth 
is driven by output growth as in the Kaldor-Verdoorn model (Amsden 1989: 109-12). 
In her analysis, the disciplining of subsidies in South Korea ensured that business 
organizations delivered growth, and this growth then drove productivity. The big 
business groups who were supported became competitive as a result of productivity 
growth and had little reason to collude or seek to protect their subsidies. Competition 
and competitiveness were therefore consequences of growth (Amsden 1989: 150). If 
this mechanism was generally effective, the role of disciplining would only be to ensure 
that supported firms actually delivered output growth. Productivity growth would 
automatically follow through learning-by-doing and would lead to the achievement of 
competitiveness. The expectation that output growth results in productivity growth can 
be justified if the most relevant knowledge gap was missing technical know-how, and 
Amsden suggests this was indeed the case. If so, output growth would ensure that 
managers, supervisors and workers got the opportunity to work on production lines and 
their learning-by-doing would lead to productivity growth.  
 
However, if the missing knowledge was of organizational capabilities the collective 
learning process is much more complex even though the productivity gain here may be 
huge and decisive. The monitoring and disciplining required to ensure a high level of 
effort in an exercise of continuous organizational experimentation and collective 
learning can be complex. Without effective strategies for ensuring high levels of effort 
in improving organizational capabilities, subsidized firms can in principle deliver 
output growth without achieving any improvement in their organizational capabilities 
and therefore any significant productivity growth. Indeed this is exactly what happened 
in countries like India and Pakistan whose industrial policies supported growth in 
diversified business groups in the 1960s and generated high rates of output growth 
(including export growth in Pakistan), but with almost zero productivity growth 
(Ahluwalia 1991; Khan 1999). Most policy-supported firms and business groups never 
became competitive (Khan 1999, 2011, 2013b). 
 
Disciplining firms to improve their own organizational capabilities may appear to be 
unnecessary since firms should benefit by improving these capabilities. This may be 
true if the firms receiving support believe they can achieve competitiveness relatively 
easily by simply producing more output or by improving their organizational routines 
in simple ways. Otherwise, putting a lot of effort into acquiring new organizational 
capabilities may not be the most rational strategy. The effort required can be very high 
if the initial productivity gap is significant. Internal conflicts have to be managed as 
hierarchies and responsibilities are restructured and new ways of working routinized. 
Compared to the cost, the prize may not necessarily be attractive, particularly if it means 
that the firm achieving competitiveness in this way is ‘rewarded’ by losing its policy 
support and having to fend for itself in a harsh global competitive environment. Without 
compulsion to do otherwise, the rational behaviour of individuals and managers within 
the firm may well be to ‘satisfice’, in the sense described by Herbert Simon (1956, 
1983). The rational satisficing strategy may to keep producing with existing 
organizational structures and allocate effort to rent-seeking activities to protect their 
policy rents. As a result, if the penalties for non-performance are not significant or 
credible relative to the difficulty of the organizational learning, the likely outcome may 
be failure (Khan 2013a, 2013c).  
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The relatively simple disciplining strategy in East Asia with its focus on output and 
export targets achieved both a rapid acquisition of technical know-how and significant 
improvements in organizational capabilities because of exceptional conditions. 
Although Amsden’s theoretical argument focuses on the learning of technical know-
how, her detailed descriptions of learning in automobiles, shipbuilding and steel show 
that rapid improvements in productivity actually occurred through the implementation 
of new organizational routines (Amsden 1989: 175-80, 272, 80-6, 305-16). Comparing 
the organizational transformation in these South Korean companies with the relative 
organizational inertia in comparable Indian or Pakistani ones of the period leads us to 
ask why output-promoting strategies worked to induce organizational change in one 
case but not the others.  
 
Two important and exceptional characteristics of East Asian states and societies provide 
at least a partial answer. First, in the 1960s East Asian countries were just as poor as 
South Asian ones but they had relatively higher initial levels of organizational 
capabilities in manufacturing and a supply of domestic entrepreneurs and managers 
with an understanding of the problems they had to solve. Japanese colonialism had 
introduced aggressive industrialization in both South Korea and Taiwan and local 
managers who worked in modern Japanese firms understood firm organization and its 
importance for efficiency. Secondly, the macro-level distribution of organizational and 
political power within these countries (their political settlements) allowed their states 
to provide and withdraw support from businesses (Khan 2009; Khan and Blankenburg 
2009). This too was related to the nature of Japanese colonialism, which ruled in Korea 
and Taiwan with brute force, and made no use of clientelist political organizations that 
mediated social conflicts by distributing rents. In contrast, South Asia like much of the 
rest of the developing world, inherited powerful clientelist political organizations from 
British colonial times and these organizations could later be used by business 
organizations to protect their subsidies for a share of the rents.  
 
Both these features played an important role in explaining why technical and 
organizational capabilities improved when support was linked to output performance 
in East Asia but not South Asia. South Korean managers knew that they did not have 
the political networks to bargain to maintain their levels of support or to block the 
withdrawal of support if their performance was poor. If subsidies could be withdrawn 
and if output growth had to be sustained without additional subsidies, the only option 
was to improve both technical and organizational capabilities. At the same time, 
managers also believed this was feasible and had some idea of what this entailed 
because they had worked in competitive Japanese organizations in the recent past.  
 
In contrast, in countries where the initial organizational capabilities were low and 
political conditions were less fortuitous, support for output growth did not create strong 
pressures for productivity growth through the acquisition of difficult new 
organizational capabilities. Organizations with lower initial capabilities needed to put 
in much higher collective effort to achieve competitiveness and the effort required did 
not make sense given the relative ease with which subsidies could be protected through 
alliances with clientelist political organizations. The relevant learning gap could have 
been reduced with a better understanding of organizational capabilities and by 
supporting business organizations whose initial capabilities were closer to the 
competitive requirements for using particular technologies. At the same time, the 
political settlements in these countries made it unlikely that ex ante subsidies could be 
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easily withdrawn even if organizational failures were persistent. Other forms of 
providing support may have been much more effective, as we will see in the 
Bangladeshi garment industry example. Contrary to the East Asian experience, South 
Asian firms that were supported in similar ways in the 1960s achieved output growth, 
but productivity growth was low because they failed to achieve higher organizational 
capabilities and instead renegotiated levels of support, failed to repay banks and even 
evaded bankruptcy laws. A different design of policy instruments that took better 
account of initial conditions may have delivered better results. If skills were the only 
factor determining productivity, the output growth should have resulted in learning-by-
doing and productivity growth in the way Amsden suggested. But once we understand 
the interdependence of different types of knowledge required for competitiveness, it 
becomes possible to explain the South Asian experience.  
 
5. Evidence from the garments industry in Bangladesh   
The poor performance of industrial policy strategies in Pakistan in the 1960s left the 
new state of Bangladesh that emerged in 1971, when East Pakistan became 
independent, in a very vulnerable position. Its manufacturing sector was small and not 
very competitive and the dominant jute industry was losing its global importance. 
However, out of the economic chaos, the garments and textiles industry emerged in the 
late 1970s and rapidly achieved global competitiveness. Within three decades it 
employed almost five million workers and contributed almost 80 percent of the 
country’s export earnings. The growth of the labour-intensive sector also had a huge 
impact on poverty reduction as GDP growth rates crept up from around 5 percent a year 
in 2000 to around 6.5 percent in the 2010s.  
 
The garments industry take-off in Bangladesh in the 1980s is usually attributed to low 
labour costs and the liberalization that began in the late 1970s. These factors, it is 
argued, helped the country benefit from the global opportunity in garments production. 
But many other countries with low labour costs and access to world markets did not 
succeed in the garments industry. The critical element in Bangladesh was a strategy for 
financing the transfer of organizational capabilities that created the right incentives and 
compulsions for a rapid acquisition of these capabilities by the emerging Bangladeshi 
industry. A critical component of this story was the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), 
which created potential rents for garments producers in less-developed countries if they 
could produce garments of a competitive quality and at a competitive price within the 
additional margins allowed by the MFA.  
 
The MFA emerged in 1974 driven by US textile and garments interests. Its purpose was 
to protect the American garments and textile industry from competition from countries 
like Hong Kong, South Korea and Turkey that were more competitive than the USA in 
the sector. It imposed quotas on imports of garments from these countries to the USA, 
and as a concession, least developed countries (LDCs) were given quota free access to 
the American market. No LDC at that time had any capacity in competitive garments 
production, so this was a relatively safe compromise from the American perspective. 
The policy did however create potential quota rents for these less-developed countries, 
which they could capture if they managed to deliver garments of the appropriate quality 
at a price that was lower than the price in the protected American market. Once 
established exporters had filled their quotas, supplies in the US market dried up and the 
local price of garments rose to the level where local US producers could begin to supply. 
18 
 
This was the intention after all. The unintended consequence was that if LDC exporters 
could achieve quality exports at or below this internal American market price, they 
could earn a rent relative to the global competitive price. This was the quota rent.  
 
This on its own would not have been sufficient because the low level of basic 
organizational capabilities in LDCs including Bangladesh meant that they could not 
produce quality garments even at the quota protected US market price and even with 
their very low wages. Here, the role of the Bangladesh government was important in 
backing a financial agreement that funded the acquisition of organizational capabilities 
and agreeing to fast-track critical regulatory changes. The financial agreement was 
between a Bangladeshi company, Desh, and a South Korean chaebol, Daewoo, where 
the acquisition of organizational capabilities was financed without ex ante subsidies 
being given to the Bangladeshi company.  
 
The terms of the deal were that Desh would invest in the machinery and labour required 
for setting up a large-scale garments operation in Bangladesh. Daewoo undertook to 
invest in the organizational learning process by hosting around 130 Bangladeshi 
managers and supervisory staff at its factory in Busan to learn the relevant 
organizational and technical know-how on site. Daewoo’s reward would be an 8% 
royalty on the eventual sales of Desh. In terms of the margins typical in the industry 
this was a huge return to Daewoo, and it was only possible because of the expectation 
that Desh would capture an MFA quota rent. The deal effectively passed the potential 
quota rents to Daewoo as ex post rents rewarding their effort and investments in the 
transfer of organizational capabilities to the Bangladeshi side. This ex post rent could 
only be accessed by Daewoo if Desh succeeded in exporting to the American market.  
 
The results were spectacular. The organizational and technical learning that was 
planned to take more than two years in Busan was finished in less than one. The 
incentives on both sides were to get the training and learning done as soon as possible 
so both sides could start making money. The managers trained in Busan came back to 
Bangladesh with a good initial knowledge of the organizational outcomes required and 
began to adapt South Korean organizational routines to Bangladeshi conditions. Desh 
exports grew at close to 100% a year for the next few years. Of the 130 mid-level 
managers who went to Busan, 115 set up their own factories within two years. Desh did 
not prevent its managers setting up their own firms for two reasons, apart from the fact 
that it would have been practically difficult to prevent them doing so. First, once the 
competitive organizational structure of the firm was established, it did not matter if one 
or two managers occasionally left. Secondly, it also became obvious that as more 
garments factories were set up, more foreign buyers came to the country. Imitation and 
clustering were therefore advantageous to first movers and they made no attempt to 
prevent imitation, contrary to the expectations of the Hausmann and Rodrik discovery 
model (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; Khan 2013a).  
 
Imitation was rapid because the first movers adopted efficient organizational routines 
and adapted them to Bangladeshi conditions. The organizational capabilities required 
to become competitive could be acquired by imitators at relatively low levels of 
experimentation and effort because the organizational forms were not too far distant 
from the initial capabilities of many Bangladeshi entrepreneurs and managers. 
Nevertheless, without the initial learning and demonstration of effective organizational 
structures by the first movers, it is unlikely that the organizational capabilities would 
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have spontaneously emerged, and indeed garments industries did not spontaneously 
emerge in other LDCs. The additional productivity growth that was subsequently 
achieved by further experimentation and refinement of organizational structures and 
routines and skills development through learning-by-doing was sufficient to make 
Bangladesh non-reliant on MFA within a few years.  
 
The Bangladeshi garments industry thus became globally competitive by adopting 
strategies for acquiring basic organizational capabilities of quality control, inventory 
management and cost management. A substantial amount of growth could then be 
achieved through horizontal imitation. This horizontal growth is still continuing four 
decades later. However, as parts of the Bangladesh garments and textile industry began 
to move up the value chain, the need for intermediate levels of organizational 
capabilities and skills emerged, to operate more complex machinery, maintain higher 
levels of quality control and manage more complex production processes. Employers 
and policy-makers observed the difficulty of raising productivity and attributed this 
quite accurately to knowledge gaps constraining the broad-based upgrading of the 
industry. However, the nature of the knowledge gaps and their interdependent nature 
was once again not fully appreciated. Instead, the conventional wisdom is that 
improving technical and vocational education and training (TVET), together with 
improvements in formal education would help Bangladesh (and countries like it) 
upgrade their emerging manufacturing sectors (ADB 2015a, 2015b).  
 
Surveys of employers appear to support this interpretation since employers themselves 
are typically unaware of their own missing organizational capabilities. They are most 
likely to attribute their low productivity to knowledge gaps in their workforce. An ILO 
survey on skills gaps in Bangladeshi firms found that the three most important gaps 
reported by firms were ‘basic knowledge’ reported 46 times in the sample, ‘job skills’ 
reported 29 times and the absence of ‘industrial behaviour’ reported 44 times (Rahman, 
et al. 2012: Table 10.4.8). The first two gaps clearly correspond to gaps in codified 
knowledge and skills. The third gap, a mysterious absence of industrial behaviour that 
Bangladeshi employers attributed to their workers, is reminiscent of the behavioural 
shortcomings of Indian workers identified by Clark and Wolcott (2012). This 
behavioural deficiency is more likely to be a reflection of the low organizational 
capabilities of the firms themselves. The interdependence problem means that the 
provision of education and skills without closing the organizational capability gap is 
likely to deliver poor returns. Indeed, despite massive investments in TVET and 
secondary education, the movement up the value chain has been very slow in the 
Bangladeshi garments industry.  
 
Nevertheless, there are examples of successful upgrading to intermediate levels in 
Bangladesh. These examples demonstrate the relevance of organizational learning for 
achieving further productivity improvements as the country attempts to move from 
basic to intermediate levels of organizational capabilities. The German Investment and 
Development Corporation, DEG, supported and later evaluated an internal skills 
upgrading programme of a Bangladeshi garments manufacturer, JMS Holdings Ltd. 
(DEG 2016). JMS is one of the larger garments groups in Bangladesh, with a total 
employment of around 6300 workers, around 70% of whom are women. Like most 
Bangladeshi garments manufacturers, the group had basic organizational capabilities 
and was competitive in relatively low-end products with low labour productivity. 
Between 2012 and 2014 it engaged in a significant internal upgrading and capacity 
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expansion plan, partially financed by DEG. The programme engaged an international 
textile consulting company, Gherzi, who had experience in the Turkish textile industry, 
to assist with the upgrading. The training involved a conventional TVET operation that 
assisted skills development, but also and critically, an organizational restructuring of 
production lines. The total investment was USD 1.5 million, of which USD 820,000 
was invested in skills upgrading.  
 
The results were ‘tremendously positive’, with productivity going up by 37% and 
output by 74% in two years. The quality of products improved and input wastage 
declined by more than 80% just between 2014 and 2015. Profits increased by more than 
USD 1 million since 2012. According to the consultants from Gherzi, only around 
three-tenths of the total productivity growth of 37% could be attributed to the TVET or 
skills training part of the programme. The other seven-tenths were due to the 
‘optimization of the production layout’ and new equipment. The study concluded that 
“the most important productivity lever is the optimization of production layout, 
followed by the training of employees, and lastly the usage of new machines” (DEG 
2016: 7). The contribution of new machinery was therefore even less than the three-
tenths attributed to skills training implying that the biggest effect, possibly around half 
of the total productivity growth was due to better production organization. The 
improved organization and management of a more sophisticated production process is 
an improvement in organizational capabilities towards intermediate levels. This 
allowed JMS to engage in higher-valued garments production that responded to 
ongoing improvements in design, quality control and productivity, thereby enhancing 
local value added and profitability. 
 
The JMS upgrading experience again underlines the interdependence of skills training 
and the acquisition of organizational capabilities. Moreover, once again this was 
achieved by incentivizing an external company to transfer organizational capabilities 
to a Bangladeshi company rather than providing ex ante subsidies to the Bangladeshi 
company to raise its organizational capabilities in its own way. These examples 
underline the importance of policies addressing specific combinations of knowledge 
gaps. They also suggest that policies supporting learning will only work if they induce 
appropriately high levels of learning effort. In countries where political settlements do 
not allow credible disciplining of firms that are given ex ante subsidies for learning, 
subsidy policies are not likely to be effective in inducing improvements in 
organizational capabilities. But this is not an argument for leaving things to the market. 
Without the strategy of re-allocating MFA rents to Daewoo in the initial Desh-Daewoo 
example, or the low interest loans provided by the DEG in the JMS example, the 
relevant organizational capabilities may not have been spontaneously acquired. There 
is therefore a significant potential role for governments, but its role is to provide policy 
support that mimics the incentive structures in the successful examples discussed 
above. 
 
The interdependence of knowledge gaps can help to explain why international 
evaluations of skills training programmes find that they generally have a low impact on 
productivity. A World Bank review of a large number of evaluations of training 
programmes across both advanced and developing countries concluded that these 
programmes generally did not have a high impact on wages (a measure of increased 
productivity) though there was some impact on employment (Betcherman, et al. 2004: 
53). The performance of training programmes was even poorer in developing countries. 
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The generally poor results reported could be due to two sorts of reasons. It could be that 
the delivery of the technical know-how was itself weak. But more plausibly, given the 
poor performance across so many countries and programmes, it is more plausible that 
the complementary organizational capabilities required for utilizing these skills 
effectively and allowing productivity to increase were missing.  
 
Estimates of the returns to codified education in Bangladesh and other developing 
countries also show low rates of return. The World Bank estimates that returns to formal 
education in Bangladesh are 3.6% for primary, 6% for secondary and 9.2% for 
undergraduate education, reflecting the relatively low improvements in incomes as a 
result of education (Dohmen 2009: 15). These figures seem to be at odds with the 
widely reported shortage of college-educated workers in firms for supervisory and other 
roles and the outmigration of individuals with formal knowledge to more advanced 
countries where they earn considerably higher returns. But the figures are easily 
explicable if we remember that without simultaneous investments in organizational 
capabilities, the potential of formal education cannot be realized within Bangladesh. In 
other words, the returns to both skills training and formal education may critically 
depend on a simultaneous upgrading of organizational capabilities. Ironically, this 
interdependence is not fully recognized even in countries like Bangladesh which have 
achieved some successes in developing basic and some intermediate levels of 
organizational capabilities.  
 
Finally, our analysis can shed light on why it is so difficult to raise the quality of 
schools, colleges and skills training institutes in countries where organizational 
capabilities are low. High capability firms are critically important not only for creating 
job opportunities for skilled and educated workers, but also because managers in well-
working organizations are able to discriminate between well-trained and badly-trained 
applicants. Managers in well-working organizations know what type of person they are 
looking for in a particular task and can usually quickly identify when that person’s 
training is inadequate. However, when the overall productivity of an organization is 
low because of poor organizational capability, an individual skilled worker is unlikely 
to have any impact on productivity or profitability. These firms therefore find it hard to 
discriminate a properly educated or trained worker from others, and are likely to pay 
all workers a low salary or wage. This can destroy incentives for training providers of 
all types to maintain quality since there is no premium for providing quality education 
and skills. The result can be a vicious cycle where poor organizational capabilities result 
in low standards of formal education and skills training that in turn make it difficult to 
raise organizational capabilities.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Structural transformation raises significant challenges for investments in knowledge. 
The challenges are also different across countries with different initial conditions. The 
argument in this paper is that it is important for policy to recognize and respond to the 
interdependence of formal knowledge, skills and organizational capabilities. Secondly, 
while the importance of organizational capabilities is recognized in the advanced 
country literature, the importance of basic and intermediate organizational capabilities 
has often been downplayed in favour of the analysis of dynamic organizational 
capabilities. This too is a mistake, not only in the context of developing countries, but 
also in the context of regeneration challenges in depressed regions and sectors of 
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advanced countries. The more underdeveloped the initial organizational capabilities 
and the more difficult it is to discipline firms given the characteristics of the political 
settlement, the less likely is it that generalized policies of support for firms will be 
effective in achieving competitiveness. Yet, the experience of successful improvements 
in organizational capabilities in the garments industry in Bangladesh, a least developed 
country with a clientelist political settlement, shows that appropriately designed support 
policies can work in developing skills and organizational capabilities to create 
competitive industries.  
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